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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremiah Spicer appeals the district court's decision to revoke his probation, or
alternatively, its decision to not reduce his sentence at that time.

He asserts that

decision constituted an abuse of the district court's discretion.
As part of his appeal, Mr. Spicer requested that several transcripts be produced
and augmented to the appellate record, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied that
motion.

He renewed that motion, providing additional authorities and rationales in

support of his request, but the Idaho Supreme Court denied that renewed motion as
well.

Mr. Spicer contends this constitutes a violation of his state and federal

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. 1 As a result, this Court should
grant Mr. Spicer access to the requested transcripts and allow him the opportunity to file
supplemental briefing raising any issues arising from review of those transcripts.
In the event that request is denied, this Court should still vacate the district
court's order revoking probation and executing the underlying sentence without
modification and remand the case for a new disposition hearing. Alternatively, it should
reduce Mr. Spicer's sentence as it deems appropriate.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Spicer pied guilty to one count of statutory
rape, in exchange for the State's recommendation of a suspended ten-year unified
sentence, with two years fixed. (R., pp.55-56.) These charges were Mr. Spicer's first
adult felony charges and his prior criminal history was minimal.

1

(Presentence

Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.3-4.)2

Mr. Spicer also has a documented

history of mental health issues, including learning disabilities, attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder, bipolar disorder, 3 and other unspecified personality disorders.
(See, e.g., PSI, pp.8, 225.) Ultimately, the district court imposed a unified sentence of
fifteen years, with six years fixed, which it suspended for a twenty-year term of
probation. (R., p.78.)
Mr. Spicer subsequently admitted to violating the terms of his probation.
(R., pp.124-25.)

The district court revoked Mr. Spicer's probation and retained

jurisdiction. (R., pp.128-29.) While in the rider program, Mr. Spicer put "effort into his
work and [did] the maximum rather than the minimum" in his assigned classes. (PSI,
p.174.) When his learning disabilities impacted his programming, "he . . . sought help
from peers and accepted feedback in class." (PSI, p.174.) As a result of his efforts, he
earned a recommendation for probation.

(PSI, p.172.)

The district court returned

Mr. Spicer to probation for a period of nineteen years. (R., pp.139.)
The

State

subsequently

filed

another

motion

for

probation

violation.

(R., pp.158-61.) Mr. Spicer admitted to two of the allegations, and the remainder were
dismissed. (Tr., p.2, L.22 - p.3, L.1.) A letter was submitted on Mr. Spicer's behalf from
Clearwater Rehabilitation Services, which indicated that Mr. Spicer was welcome in that
program, since he did not, in the clinical director's opinion, present a danger to himself

1

Mr. Spicer recognizes that the Idaho Supreme Court recently heard argument in a
case raising similar issues. State v. Brunet, Docket No. 39550. Obviously, the decision
in that case may affect or resolve some of the issues raised in this brief.
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic PDF file
"SpicerPSI." Included in this file are the PSI report and all the documents attached
thereto (mental health evaluations, addendum from rider staff, etc.).
3 Mr. Spicer's most recent evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2524 calls the diagnosis of
bipolar disorder into doubt. (PSI, p.140.)
2

or the community, and would receive better rehabilitation opportunities in the
community. (PSI, p.25.) However, the new evaluation performed pursuant to I.C. § 192524, besides suggesting that Mr. Spicer's diagnosis of bipolar disorder was wrong,
suggested that treatment was not the key to effecting change in his behavior.

(PSI,

p.140.)
At the disposition hearing, Mr. Spicer requested another opportunity to complete
probation, and counsel mentioned, as alternative options, a second period of retained
jurisdiction, or modification of the sentence to fifteen years, with only three years fixed.
(Tr., p.29, L.1 - p.30, L.24.)

Mr. Spicer also expressed his remorse and accepted

responsibility for his actions. (Tr., p.31, Ls.6-18.) The district court, however, relying
primarily on the new 19-2524 evaluation, as well as a report from Mr. Spicer's probation
officer asserting that continued supervision of Mr. Spicer would be "challenging" (PSI,
p.150), decided to revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence without
modification.

(Tr., p.35, Ls.6-1 O; R., pp.174-76.)

Mr. Spicer filed a timely notice of

appeal from the district court's order. (R., pp.178-80.)
On appeal, Mr. Spicer moved to augment the record with transcripts from the
change of plea hearing held on October 2, 2008, the sentencing hearing held on
January 23, 2009, the evidentiary (admit/deny) hearing held on January 28, 2008, the
disposition hearing held on February 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on
August 12, 2010.

(Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof, filed July 15, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court denied
that motion without prejudice. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule Without Prejudice, dated July 29, 2013 (emphasis in original).)
Mr. Spicer later renewed his motion, providing additional authorities and rationales
3

demonstrating why the requested transcripts needed to be augmented to the appellate
record.

(Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and

Statement in Support Thereof, filed September 9, 2013.) The Idaho Supreme Court
also denied that motion without explanation.

(Order Denying Renewed Motion to

Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule, dated October 15, 2013 (emphasis in
original).)

4

ISSUES
1.

Whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Spicer due process and equal
protection when it denied his motion to augment the record with transcripts
necessary for review of the issues on appeal.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Spicer's
probation or, alternatively, when it executed his sentence without modification
when it did so.

5

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Spicer Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With Transcripts Necessary For Review
Of The Issues On Appeal
A.

Introduction
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees

indigent defendants that they will not be denied access to transcripts which are relevant
to issues they intend to raise on appeal. So long as the record reflects a colorable need
for such a transcript, a court may not refuse to provide that transcript unless the State
proves that the transcript is not relevant to an issue raised on appeal.
Mr. Spicer has raised a challenge to the district court's decision to revoke his
probation and execute his sentence, or, alternatively, its decision to not reduce his
sentence when it did so. To present those claims, he requested various transcripts be
made part of the appellate record. The Idaho Supreme Court denied the request for the
transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on October 2, 2008, the sentencing
hearing held on January 23, 2009, the admit/deny hearing held on January 28, 2010,
the disposition hearing held on February 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on
August 12, 2010.
As such, Mr. Spicer is also challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his
request for these transcripts.

Mr. Spicer asserts that the requested transcripts are

relevant to the challenge of the district court's decisions when it revoked his probation
and executed his sentence because the applicable standard of review requires an
appellate court to conduct an independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in
order to properly evaluate the district court's decisions.
6

B.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Spicer With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Spicer Due Process And Equal Protection
Because He Cannot Obtain An Effective Appellate Review Of His Claims

1.

The United States Constitution And The Idaho Constitution Require, As
Part Of Their Protections Of Due Process And Equal Protection,
Transcripts Of Relevant Hearings To Be Provided To Indigent Defendants

The United States Constitution, as well as the Constitution of the State of Idaho,
guarantees criminal defendants due process and equal protection under the law.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const. art. I,§ 13. Due process requires the defendant
be given notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 333 (1976); State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991), overruled on other
grounds by State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88 (1998). Essentially, due process requires that
judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv. of Durham
City, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Card, 121 Idaho at 445. Those same standards have
been applied to article I, section 13 of the Idaho Constitution. Maresh v. State, Dep't of
Health & Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to an appeal is created by statute.

See

I.C. § 19-2801. If an indigent defendant requests a relevant transcript, such transcript
must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-863(a); I.C.R. 5.2(a);
I.C.R. 54.7(a). An order revoking probation is made after the judgment of conviction
and affects the defendant's substantial rights.

State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852

(Ct. App. 1983). As such, it may be appealed as a matter of right.

I.AR 11(c)(9);

State v. Thomas, 146 Idaho 592, 594 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of whether
transcripts must be provided when such a right is established.
established two fundamental themes.

Its decisions have

First, the scope of the due process and equal

7

protection clauses is broad. Second, disparate treatment of indigent defendants is not
tolerable. As a result, the State must provide an adequate record for appellate review,
but that record need not include frivolous or unnecessary materials.
The seminal opinion from the United States Supreme Court is Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956). In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial
court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript
of the proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 U.S. at 13. At that
time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death-penalty
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that:
[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, weak and powerful alike is an age old
problem .... Both equal protection and due process emphasize the central aim
of our entire judicial system-all people charged with crime must, so far as the law
is concerned, "stand on an equality before the bar of justice in every American
court."
Id. at 16-17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940)). As such, "[i]n

criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account
of religion, race, or color." Id. Furthermore:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
tria! system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
8

Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitions from invidious
discriminations.
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective, merits-related appellate review.
At the same time, the United States Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript
is not necessary in instances where a less expensive, but no less adequate, alternative
exists. Id. at 20.
The United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding in Griffin when it struck
down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court be accompanied with a
requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

See Bums v. Ohio, 360

U.S. 252 (1959). The Court held:
[O]nce the State chooses to establish appellate review in criminal cases, it
may not foreclose indigents from access to any phase of that procedure
because of their poverty. This principle is no less applicable where the
State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase of its
appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second
phase of that procedure solely because of his indigency.
Id. at 257. To permit otherwise, according to the Court, would result in an impermissible

destruction of the defendant's ability to pursue the right afforded him by the State. Id. at
258.
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court clarified its statement in Griffin that a stenographic transcript is not necessary if an equivalent alternative is available.

Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494-95 (1963). To that end, the Court did note
that "part or all of the stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to
consideration of the appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds
unnecessarily in such circumstances."

Id. at 495.
9

However, the Court went on to

discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance
of the requested transcripts, and it ultimately concluded that the issues raised by those
defendants could not be adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic
transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
The United States Supreme Court continued to expand the protections identified
in Griffin, applying them to non-felony offenses.
U.S. 189 (1971).

See Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404

Additionally, it placed the burden on the State to prove that the

requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on appeal. Id. at
195. In doing so, the Court held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he or she needs the requested items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. If
a review of the appellate record establishes a need for the requested transcripts, it
becomes the State's burden to prove that the requested transcripts are not necessary
for the appeal. Id.
Both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals have recognized
and applied the United States Supreme Court's precedent in this regard.

See, e.g.,

Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App.
2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007). As such, if the record reflects
that the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal and the State has not proved
that they are unnecessary for appellate review thereof, due process and equal
protection mandate that those transcripts be created and augmented to the record.

2.

The Transcripts Requested By Mr. Spicer Are Relevant To The Issues He
Has Raised On Appeal

The requested transcripts are necessary to review Mr. Spicer's claim that the
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation, or, alternatively, failed
10

to reduce his sentence when it did so.

The requested transcripts are all necessary

because the Idaho Supreme Court held that the appellate courts will conduct an
independent review of the record available to the district court.

State v. Pierce, 150

Idaho 1, 5 (2010). Particularly, in probation revocation cases, such as this, the standard
of review of probation violation cases involves a review of the entire record.

See

State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149 (1986). This includes information from the original

sentencing hearing and the change of plea hearing where the district court heard from
the defendant about the acceptance of responsibility by pleading guilty.

See

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that

is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire
record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)). This standard of review is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required
to state their sentencing rationale on the record. See State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666
(1984).

The transcript from the October 2, 2008, change of plea transcript is specifically
necessary based on prior decisions by Idaho's appellate courts, which are, for the
moment, good law. State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271, 276 (Ct. App. 2000) ("Burdett has
failed to include the transcript form his change of plea hearing wherein, according to the
district court minutes, he was examined by the court regarding his guilty plea. Portions
of a transcript missing on appeal are presumed to support the actions of the district
court."); see also State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805 (1996) (applying this same
presumption in absence of a complete record). The minutes of that hearing indicate
11

that Mr. Spicer was "sworn and examined by the Court." (R., p.58.) Therefore, because
his comments would be available for consideration at a future sentencing determination
(like the one currently on appeal), they are part of the record an appellate court
reviewing that future determination would consider.

As such, a transcript of the

October 2, 2008, hearing should be augmented to the record.
The transcript from the January 23, 2009, sentencing hearing is specifically
necessary because Mr. Spicer addressed the court during that hearing. (R., p.75.) The
defendant's comments of allocution at a sentencing hearing are relevant to the
sentencing determinations. See, e.g., State v. Gervasi, 138 Idaho 813, 816 (Ct. App.
2003), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Hansen, 154 Idaho 882, 887-88
(Ct. App. 2013) (finding that, while allocution is important, it does not rise to the level of
a constitutionally protected right, as the opinions in Gervasi and other cases had
suggested), rev. denied.

Therefore, because his comments would be available for

consideration at a future sentencing determination, they are part of the record
an appellate court reviewing that future determination would consider.

As such, a

transcript of the January 23, 2009, hearing should be augmented to the record.
The transcript from the January 28, 2010, admit/deny hearing is specifically
necessary for the same reasons that the transcript from the October 2, 2008, change of
plea hearing is necessary. That is because the same sort of issues are discussed at an
admit/deny hearing as at a change of plea hearing. The defendant makes statements
about his culpability, which is a factor that is considered in sentencing determinations.

See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,815 (Ct. App. 2010) (indicating that acknowledgment
of guilty is one of the first steps to accepting responsibility and rehabilitation). He also
provides a factual basis for the allegations of wrong-doing.
12

Therefore, the same

concerns regarding the consideration of those proceedings at a future sentencing
determination exist at the admit/deny hearing. Compare Burdett, 134 Idaho at 276; see
also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805. As such, because his comments would be available for

consideration at a future sentencing determination, they are part of the record
an appellate court reviewing that future determination would consider.

As such, a

transcript of the January 28, 2010, hearing should be augmented to the record.
The transcript from the February 11, 2010, disposition hearing is specifically
necessary for the same reasons that a transcript from the January 23, 2009, sentencing
hearing is necessary.

The minutes of the February 11, 2010, hearing indicate that

Mr. Spicer addressed the district court. (R., p.127.) Disposition hearings, such as the
one held on February 11, 2010, deal with similar concerns to sentencing hearings, since
the district court is deciding whether or not to continue the defendant on probation, or
whether to execute the underlying sentence and remand the defendant to custody.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). That decision is guided by the

same factors that the district court considers at sentencing. See State v. Merwin, 131
Idaho 642, 648 (1998). Therefore, the defendant's statements at a disposition hearing
are as relevant to future sentencing determination as a statement in allocution made at
an initial sentencing hearing. See Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at
816. As such, those statements are part of the record that an appellate court reviewing
a future sentencing determination would consider.

Therefore, a transcript of the

February 11, 2010, hearing should be augmented to the appellate record.
The transcript from the August 12, 2010, rider review hearing is also specifically
necessary for the same reasons that a transcript from the January 23, 2009, sentencing
hearing is necessary.

Rider review hearings, such as the one held on October 25,
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2012, deal with similar concerns to sentencing hearings, since the district court is
deciding whether or not to release the defendant on probation or execute his sentence
and remand him to custody. State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205 (Ct. App. 1990); see also
Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648. That decision is guided by the same factors that the district

See Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648.

court considers at sentencing.

Therefore, the

defendant's statements at a rider review hearing are as relevant to future sentencing
determinations as a statement in allocution made at an initial sentencing hearing. See
Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88; Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. At that hearing, Mr. Spicer

addressed the district court again. (R., p.135.) As such, Mr. Spicer's comments at this
hearing are part of the record that an appellate court reviewing a future sentencing
determination would consider.

Therefore, a transcript of that hearing should be

augmented to the appellate record.
However, the Idaho Court of Appeals recently discussed the scope of review of
an order revoking a defendant's probation in response to a similar challenge.

See

State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals held that the

transcripts of the proceedings predating the probation violation currently on appeal were
not necessary to the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the
second probation violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it
based its revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings."
Id. at 621.

In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeals refused to address the

defendant's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court had denied him due process on the
basis that it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho Supreme
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Court. 4 Id. at 621. However, the Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the
authority to review a renewed motion to augment, which contained information or
argument not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court, if it was filed with the Court of
Appeals after the case was assigned to it. Id.; see also State v. Cornelison, 154 Idaho
793, 796 (Ct. App. 2013), rev. denied.

Nevertheless, in cases where it has been

presented with such a motion, it has denied the motion without explanation.

See

State v. Jorgensen, 2013 Unpublished Opinion No. 615, p.2 (Ct. App. August 5, 2013),
pet. rev. filed. As such, it appears unlikely that filing a renewed motion with the Court of
Appeals will lead to anything except a new, independent violation of Mr. Spicer's due
process and equal protection rights.

If the Court of Appeals is correct, and it is without authority to decide such questions,
then an order assigning this case to the Court of Appeals would also constitute an
independent violation of Mr. Spicer's state and federal constitutional rights to due
process. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I§ 13. As the Idaho Supreme
Court has explained:
4

It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981 ).
Card, 121 Idaho at 445. In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by
statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. Defendants have the right to appeal from judgments
affecting their substantial rights. Thomas, 146 Idaho at 594; I.A.R.11 (c)(9). The
decision to revoke probation is such an order. Therefore, since the Fourteenth
Amendment's protections apply to all proceedings affecting this appeal, the Idaho
Supreme Court would violate those protections by assigning this case to the Court of
Appeals knowing it was without authority to resolve the issues presented therein.
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Despite asserting it was without authority to consider the issue, the Court of
Appeals turned to the merits of the claim in Morgan, explaining that the scope of review
for a revocation determination did not include a review of those previous hearings:
[l]n reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a//
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane.
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues
which are properly made part of the record on appeal.
Id. (emphasis in original). However, whether or not the transcripts of the requested
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation revocation
hearing is irrelevant in regard to whether the transcripts are relevant to the issues on
appeal.
In reaching a decision regarding the defendant's sentence, a district court is not
limited to considering only that information offered at the hearing from which the appeal
is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own official

position and observations. See Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the district court heard
during trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318, 321 (1977) (recognizing that the district
court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the
judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs
therein involved"). In fact, the Court of Appeals has held that such review is not only
proper, but is actually expected because "the judge hardly could be expected to
disregard what he already knew about [the defendant] from the other case."
State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491, 495 (Ct. App. 1984). Thus, whether the prior hearings
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were transcribed at the time of the revocation hearing leading to the appeal is irrelevant
because the district court may rely upon the information it already knows from presiding
over the prior hearings when it made the sentencing decision after revoking probation.
In fact, the reason that the appellate courts should look to the entire record when
reviewing the executed sentence has been explained by the Court of Appeals:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons.
First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order
execution of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not
artificially segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment
categories. The judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire
course of events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision.
When reviewing that decision, we should consider the same facts.
Second, when a sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the
defendant has scant reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the
probation is later revoked, and the sentence ordered into execution, does
the issue of an excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were
we to adopt the state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived
if not made on immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but
suspending a sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive
appeals as a hedge against the risk that probation someday might be
revoked. We see no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do
we wish to see the appellate system cluttered with such cases.
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055-56 (Ct. App. 1989). As such, when an appellant

files an appeal from a sentence executed after the revocation of probation, the
applicable standard of review requires an independent and comprehensive inquiry into
the events which occurred prior to the probation revocation proceedings, as well as the
events which occurred during those proceedings.
The basis for this standard of review is that the district court "naturally and quite
properly remembers the entire course of events and considers all relevant facts in
reaching a decision." Id. It follows that "[w]hen reviewing that decision, [an appellate
court] should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the

17

district court must expressly reference prior proceedings at the probation disposition
hearing in order for this standard to become applicable. To the contrary, the appellate
courts will presume that the district court considered the prejudgment events when
determining what sentence should be executed after revoking probation. See Sivak,
105 Idaho at 907; Wallace, 98 Idaho at 321; Downing, 136 Idaho at 373-74; Gibson,
106 Idaho at 495.

Therefore, whether or not the prior hearings were transcribed is

irrelevant, as an appellate court will assume that the district court will remember the
events from the prior proceedings when it executes a sentence after revoking probation.
See id.

3.

The Idaho Supreme Court Violated Mr. Spicer's Constitutional Rights By
Denying His Motion To Augment The Record With The Relevant
Transcripts

Since the requested transcripts are relevant under the applicable standard of
review, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision to deny Mr. Spicer access to those
transcripts constitutes a violation of his due process and equal protection rights. See,
e.g., Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195; Callaghan, 143 Idaho at 859.

For example, when a

verbatim transcript was necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the appellate court, the
courts improperly foreclosed access to the appellate process by denying indigent
defendants access to such transcripts. Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-85 (1963).
The United States Supreme Court made it clear that it is "constitutionally invalid ... to
prevent an indigent from taking an effective appeal." Id. (emphasis added). Similarly, in
Idaho, an appellant must provide an adequate record for review or face procedural
default:

"It is well established that an appellant bears the burden to provide an

adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the merits of the claims of
error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing on appeal, they are
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presumed to support the actions of the trial court."5 State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34
(Ct. App. 1999); see also Mowrey, 128 Idaho at 805 (applying this presumption in
absence of a complete record). Therefore, if Mr. Spicer fails to provide the appellate
court with the transcripts necessary for review of his claim, this legal presumption will
apply and Mr. Spicer's claims regarding the excessiveness of his sentence will not be
addressed on their merits. In effect, that presumption (a result of the Idaho Supreme
Court not affording him access to relevant transcripts) would deprive him of an effective
appeal, making the appeal constitutionally invalid on due process and equal protection
grounds. See Lane, 372 U.S. at 480-85.

If transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes of those hearings, it is
possible the appellate courts might find these minutes to be sufficient to conduct a
meaningful appellate review, and so the transcripts are not necessary for appellate
review in such a case. However, the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed]
that appellate counsel not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate
record for [that] Court's review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).
Given that holding, it is unlikely that the minutes will be sufficient to conduct a
meaningful review, and thus, a record containing only the minutes is unlikely to comport
with the constitutional requirements to provide due process and equal protection.
For example, the minutes of the February 2, 2011, sentencing hearing only
indicate that Mr. Spicer "Address[ed] the Court." (R., p.75.) They do not make any
reference to the contents of the statements. (See R., p.75.) The contents of those
statements, particularly since they would be classified as the defendant's statements of
allocution, are relevant to an abuse of discretion in a sentencing claim, such as is being
made in this case (see Section II, infra). See, e.g., Hansen, 154 Idaho at 887-88;
Gervasi, 138 Idaho at 816. The same problem exists in regard to the minutes of the
other hearings for which Mr. Spicer requested transcripts. (See, e.g., R., p.58 (minutes
of the October 2, 2008, change of plea hearing, indicating that Mr. Spicer was "sworn &
examined by the Court"); R., pp.124-25 (minutes of the January 28, 2010, evidentiary
(admit/deny) hearing, indicating only that Mr. Spicer was prepared to make admissions
to certain of the allegations); R., p.127 (minutes of the February 11, 2010, disposition
hearing, indicating that Mr. Spicer "address[ed] the court"); R., p.135 (minutes from the
August 12, 2010, rider review hearing, indicating that Mr. Spicer "address[ed] the
court").) Therefore, the minutes, which do not provide the substance of these
statements, are insufficient in this case to provide for adequate review. See Murphy,
133 Idaho at 491.
5
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Alternatively, if it is state action alone which prevents the defendant from having
access to the necessary items, because such action is a violation of equal protection
and due process, any such presumption should no longer apply. See, e.g., id. at 485.
In that situation, the foregoing presumption should be reversed, and what occurred at
those hearings should be presumed to discredit the district court's ultimate decision to
revoke probation.

When Mr. Spicer was first placed on probation and given the

opportunity for multiple periods of probation thereafter, the district court must have
found, at each subsequent hearing, that the circumstances were right to give Mr. Spicer
the opportunity to continue his rehabilitation as a member of society. See Merwin, 131
Idaho at 648.

Therefore, by placing Mr. Spicer on probation on each of those prior

occasions, the district court must have determined that the mitigating factors presented
outweighed the aggravating factors presented. See I.C. § 19-2521; Merwin, 131 Idaho
at 648. As such, to presume that the missing transcripts of those hearings supports the
decision to revoke probation ignores the mitigating factors that were present at those
hearings and presents a negative, one-sided view of Mr. Spicer. As a result, the denial
of access to the requested transcripts has prevented Mr. Spicer from addressing those
positive factors in support of his appellate claims.

In light of that denial, Mr. Spicer

argues that the events which occurred at the subject hearings should, at least, be
presumed to invalidate the district court's final sentencing decisions in this matter.
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts necessary for
an effective, merits-based review on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to
the issues on appeal because the applicable standard of review for an appellate
sentencing claim requires the appellate court to conduct an independent review of all
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the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard of review, the focus is not
on the district court's express sentencing rationale; to the contrary, the question on
appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's ultimate sentencing decision. As
such, the decision to deny Mr. Spicer's request for the necessary transcripts will render
his appeal ineffective and meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing
transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the appellate review of Mr. Spicer's sentencing claims on the merits
and, therefore, he should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied. Since Mr. Spicer's request for those transcripts was
denied, that presumption means that the district court's sentencing decisions should be
reversed.

C.

By Failing To Provide Mr. Spicer With Access To The Requested Transcripts,
The Idaho Supreme Court Has Denied Him Due Process Because He Cannot
Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

The United States Supreme Court, relying on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, has
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment also gives defendants
the right to counsel on appeal and requires effective representation:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial-would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to the effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 397 (1985) (relying on Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353, 355-56 (1963), and Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963)). As
such, the remaining issue is defining what constitutes effective assistance of counsel on
appeal.
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According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments
to be made.

See, e.g., Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967).

The

constitutional requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained
where counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client. ... [Counsel's] role
as advocate requires that he support his client's appeal to the best of his ability. Id.;
see also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack
of access to the requested transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a
conscientious examination of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel
from determining whether there is an additional issue to raise or whether there is factual
support in favor of, or cutting against, any argument made. Therefore, Mr. Spicer has
not obtained appellate review of the court proceedings based on the merits of his claims
and likely was not provided with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the starting point for
evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance in a criminal action is the
American Bar Association's Standards For Criminal Justice, The Defense Function.
State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989), overruled on other grounds by
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991). These standards offer insight into the role
and responsibilities of appellate counsel. Specifically, those standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
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Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's
decision to revoke probation, which is now at issue.

Further, counsel is unable to

advise Mr. Spicer on the probable role the transcripts may play in his appeal.
Mr. Spicer is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Spicer his

constitutional rights to due process and equal protection, which include the right to
effective assistance of counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be
provided with access to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity
to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of
that review.

II.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Spicer's Probation Or,
Alternatively, When It Executed His Sentence Without Modification When It Did So

A.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Spicer's Probation
Mr. Spicer asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke

probation and execute his unified sentences of ten years, with four years fixed, was an
abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within
the district court's discretion. State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).
The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society." Id. The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether
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probation or incarceration is merited. Merwin, 131 Idaho at 648 (citing I.C. § 19-2521).
In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered inquiry,
determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Chavez, 134
Idaho at 312-13; see also State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, to be considered in that regard
are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally;
(3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider.
State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993). Therefore, a sentence that protects

society and also accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.;
State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). This is because the protection of

society is influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be
addressed in sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id.

Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more

lenient sentence in several cases.

See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 489-90

(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204,209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco,
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114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301
(1990); State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982).

These same factors are

appropriately considered in regard to the decision to revoke probation.

See

State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 106-07 (2009).

In this case, several of those factors are present, but were insufficiently
considered by the district court as it crafted its disposition in regard to Mr. Spicer. As a
result, it did not sufficiently consider whether Mr. Spicer's probation was adequately
serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether society required protection from Mr. Spicer
through incarceration.

See Chavez, 134 Idaho at 312.

Therefore, this disposition

constitutes an abuse of discretion.
For example, Mr. Spicer expressed his remorse and accepted responsibility for
his actions.

(Tr., p.31, Ls.6-18.)

Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance of

responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation.

See

State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). To this end, Mr. Spicer has been

making his best efforts to comply with the programs to which he is assigned. (See, e.g.,
PSI, p.174 (rider staff noting that Mr. Spicer was putting the maximum effort into his
class work); PSI, p.30 (neuropsychological evaluation performed in June 2012 noting
that "Mr. Spicer was highly motivated and appeared to be putting forth his best effort").)
This indicates that Mr. Spicer remained a good candidate for probation. Additionally,
the people helping Mr. Spicer in these rehabilitative efforts noted that incarceration
would detract from his rehabilitation. (See, e.g., PSI, pp.8, 25.) That is another factor
indicating incarceration is inappropriate. See I.C. § 19-2521(1)(b) (establishing that a
factor increasing need for incarceration is if the defendant can best receive necessary
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treatment in prison, suggesting that, in the opposite (such as Mr. Spicer's), courts
should be less inclined to incarcerate the defendant).
The problems that Mr. Spicer has had on probation appear to have been related
to his mental health issues.

(See, e.g., PSI, p.152 ("The patient has a tendency to

become easily frustrated .... "); PSI, p.6 (Mr. Spicer's guardian explaining that the LIFE
program staff's methods of dealing with Mr. Spicer would trigger outburst of anger or
frustration.)

Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires the trial court to consider a defendant's

mental illness as a sentencing factor.

Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

Mr. Spicer's condition does not demonstrate that he would be inappropriate for
probation, only that he would require more focused supervision. (See PSI, p.6; see also
PSI, p.150 (Mr. Spicer's probation officer noting that it would be a challenge to continue
supervising Mr. Spicer, not that it would be impossible).)
To that end, Mr. Spicer had a treatment program willing to continue working with
him.

(PSI, p.25.)

In addition, he has continuing support from his family members.

(See, e.g., PSI, p.146.)

Family constitutes an important part of a support network,

which can help in rehabilitation.

See Kellis, 148 Idaho at 817 (holding that familial

support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence does not equate to familial support
offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying that had the support been offered for
rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy of consideration). Therefore, when
such support networks are in place, the person is more likely to succeed on probation,
and should be afforded the opportunity to do so. Furthermore, the underlying offense
was Mr. Spicer's first adult felony and he has a minimal criminal record. (PSI, pp.3-4.)
The Idaho Supreme Court has "recognized that the first offender should be accorded
more lenient treatment than the habitual criminal."
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Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595,

(quoting State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402 (1953), overruled on other grounds by

State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971)). This is because such a person does not
yet have a fixed character for crime and so rehabilitation at this point is more likely.

Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Therefore, since these are his first felonies and he is not a
habitual offender, the time to employ rehabilitative options is now, since such
opportunities should be afforded in a timely manner. See, e.g., id.; State v. Nice, 103
Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639
(Ct. App. 1988).
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one
which considers rehabilitation, would still address all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes and
executes a sentence. Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the
imposed sentence are still present.

See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15

(Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a sentence for a period of probation addresses all the
sentencing objectives and how the court's continuing jurisdiction affects those
objectives).

In addition to restricting his liberty at the discretion of the Board of

Correction and the looming sentence, he would also be deprived of several of his rights
(such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a felony offense. Furthermore, the
district court would retain the ability to revoke probation and execute the original
sentence if Mr. Spicer were to fail to adhere to the terms of his probation. However, it
could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives were properly addressed. What
the probationary period would provide that a term sentence would not is the opportunity
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to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing Mr. Spicer to apply the lessons he would
gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting.

8.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing Mr. Spicer's Sentence
When It Revoked His Probation
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Spicer's

probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing Mr. Spicer's sentence
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so. If the district court decides to resume the execution
of the underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the authority to reduce
the sentence pursuant to Rule 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008).
The decision to not reduce a previously-pronounced sentence will be reversed on
appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion. State v. Hanington,
148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and factors considered in
such a decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id.; see Toohi/1,
103 Idaho at 568 (identifying the factors to be considered at sentencing). Therefore, the
district court needed to sufficiently consider the recognized sentencing objectives in light
of the mitigating factors in the record. See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500. A failure
to do so should result in a more lenient sentence.

See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at

489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595. As such, for all the reasons discussed in Section
ll(A), supra, the district court's decision to not reduce Mr. Spicer's sentence when it
revoked his probation constituted an abuse of discretion.
A more lenient sentence would still address all the sentencing objectives. 6
Ransom, 124 Idaho at 713. The more lenient sentence would still impose and execute a

6

Defense counsel suggested a unified term of fifteen years, with only three years fixed,
as an alternative to placing Mr. Spicer on probation. (Tr., p.28, L.25 - p.30, L.24.)
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sentence. Thus, even though the sentence in this case may be more lenient, it would
still provide for a significant period of custodial supervision, if not incarceration.
Therefore, both retribution and deterrence would be served by a more lenient sentence.
See, e.g., Crockett, 146 Idaho at 14-15 (discussing how even a sentence for a period of

probation addresses all the sentencing objectives).
In this case, the court would not lose anything in terms of protection of society,
deterrence, or punishment by imposing a more lenient sentence. Society would receive
equally similar protection in both cases, as Mr. Spicer would be in the custody of the
Department of Correction either way. He would be unable to harm society during the
period of initial incarceration, and the parole board would maintain the discretion of
whether to release him again.
What the more lenient sentence would provide that the excessive sentence
would not is the opportunity to return to his community rehabilitation programs more
quickly, and as the Supreme Court has noted, rehabilitation is more likely now than in
the future. See Owen, 73 Idaho at 402. Failing to provide the rehabilitative alternatives
would actually decrease the protection for society in the long term because such a
sentence does not decrease the risk for recidivism as effectively as a sentence which
focuses on rehabilitation. Therefore, the best way to protect society would be to provide
Mr. Spicer with rehabilitative opportunities. To not do so results in lesser protection for
society in the long term, which means the sentence fails to sufficiently address the
primary sentencing objective, and thus requires modification.
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CONCLUSION

Mr. Spicer respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and the
opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise
as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Spicer respectfully
requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate, or, in the
alternative, remand the case for a new disposition hearing.
DATED this 29 th day of October, 2013.

BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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